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COMMENT
“TRAPped” IN A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY: HOW
ABORTION RESTRICTIONS DURING THE COVID-19
PANDEMIC MIRROR EARLIER ATTACKS ON THE ABORTION
RIGHT AND HOW JUDICIAL REVIEW FAILED TO PROTECT IT
NANCY L. DORDAL*
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, states issued emergency orders
postponing certain medical procedures to curb the spread of the virus and to
preserve medical equipment and hospital capacity.1 Several states included
abortion procedures in these orders.2 Though all federal district courts
enjoined enforcement of the executive orders as applied to abortions, the
federal circuit courts split: some agreed with the district courts, but two
circuits issued mandamus relief to uphold the temporary abortion bans.3 In
their analyses of the constitutionality of such abortion bans, the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits invoked Jacobson v.
Massachusetts4 as a new and looser framework for constitutional analysis.5
This Comment will argue that the purportedly temporary abortion bans
mirror earlier attacks on the abortion right and that the two circuit courts
improperly applied the Jacobson framework when analyzing these orders.6
Sections I.A and I.B will trace the Supreme Court’s abortion rights
jurisprudence.7 Section I.C will explain the framework of constitutional

© 2021 Nancy Dordal.
*
J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author
thanks the staff of the Maryland Law Review, especially Delaney Anderson, Brandon Wharton, Erin
Weinstock, Jamy Klotzbach, Michael Sammartino, and Lydia Jines, for their invaluable editorial
support. The author also wishes to thank Professor Leigh Goodmark for her encouragement,
honesty, and wisdom. Additionally, the author is grateful to her parents, Anne and Andrew Dordal,
for instilling in the author a love of learning, her brother, Christopher Dordal, for inspiring the author
to think critically about the world around her, and her partner, Sean Martin, for his continuous
encouragement, support, and love. Lastly, the author thanks Sarah Kim Eisenhard, for always being
there.
1. See infra Section I.D.
2. See infra Section I.D.
3. See infra Section I.D.
4. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
5. See infra Section I.D.2.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Sections I.A–B.
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analysis during a public emergency.8 Sections I.D and I.E will explore
litigation relating to abortion access during the COVID-19 pandemic,
including how courts have approached states’ use of emergency orders to ban
abortions.9 Section II.A will articulate how federal courts have incorrectly
upheld state emergency orders, as applied to abortions, using the Jacobson
framework.10 Section II.B will explore how these orders, as applied to
abortions, resemble earlier attacks on abortion rights.11 Lastly, Section II.C
will contemplate how the reasoning employed by the federal courts in these
cases may implicate abortion jurisprudence down the line, both during the
pandemic and afterwards.12
I. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence has developed
significantly over the past fifty years, and it is vital to understand this body
of law as the backdrop for challenges to the constitutionality of abortion
during a pandemic.13 Section I.A explores the landmark case, Roe v. Wade,14
and the subsequent abortion case of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.15 Section I.B traces the development of the Court’s
abortion jurisprudence into the twenty-first century.16 Section I.C provides
context for the role of judicial review during a public emergency.17 Section
I.D examines how the courts have responded to state orders postponing nonemergency medical procedures as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic as
applied to abortions.18 Finally, Section I.E discusses other abortion litigation
during the COVID-19 pandemic relating to in-person requirements for
medication abortions.19
A. Early Abortion Caselaw: Roe and Casey
In the landmark case Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the constitutional
right to privacy includes a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy.20 The

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra Section I.C.
See infra Sections I.D–E.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Part II.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
505 U.S. 833 (1992); see infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.C.
See infra Section I.D.
See infra Section I.E.
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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Court qualified its decision, however, based on the gestational period of the
woman’s pregnancy.21 Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun doubted the
strength of the relationship between the Court’s articulation of the privacy
right and an absolute right to bodily autonomy,22 relying on Jacobson v.
Massachusetts23 and Buck v. Bell.24 In addition to the woman’s interest in
bodily autonomy, the Court recognized two other “separate and distinct”
interests at stake: (1) the state’s interest in protecting the woman’s health and
(2) the state’s interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.25 In
balancing these three competing interests, the Court adopted a trimester
framework for constitutional analysis.26 Critically, the Court concluded that
the state’s interests in protecting the health of the pregnant woman and the
potentiality of human life become compelling27 at the point the fetus becomes
viable.28 After the viability point is reached, states may regulate abortion,
except where an abortion is necessary to protect the life of the pregnant
woman.29
Justice Stewart concurred, noting that the constitutional right to privacy,
though not fully explained by Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion, is
implicated by the liberty interests guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment.30 Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist disputed the
right to an abortion as a fundamental right altogether31 and criticized the
Court’s use of the compelling state interest test, a test Rehnquist believed was
limited to Equal Protection questions, in its Due Process analysis.32
Another crucial case in the Court’s abortion jurisprudence came in 1992
with the fractured opinion of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern

21. Id. at 154.
22. Id.
23. 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (limiting the right to bodily autonomy in the context of the smallpox
epidemic); see also infra Section I.C.
24. 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (holding that a Virginia statute mandating sterilization of certain types
of disabled people was constitutional).
25. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
26. Id. at 163. During the first trimester, the woman’s right to bodily autonomy dominates. Id.
at 162–63. At this stage of a pregnancy, an abortion is generally safer than carrying a fetus to term,
so, according to the Court, the state’s interest in protecting the woman’s health is not yet compelling.
Id. at 163. Nor is the state’s interest in protecting the potentiality of human life yet compelling, as
the fetus is not yet viable. Id. The analysis changes during the second trimester, according to the
Roe Court. Id.
27. Id. at 163.
28. The point of viability, or the point at which a fetus could survive outside of the womb, is
around twenty-four weeks, according to the Court. Id. at 160.
29. Id. at 163–64.
30. Id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 173.
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Pennsylvania v. Casey.33 Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter jointly
wrote the controlling opinion.34 The majority clarified that the right to
terminate a pregnancy stems from the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35 The Court nominally upheld
Roe, but in their plurality opinion, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
rejected Roe’s trimester framework outright, characterizing it as legislating
from the bench.36 Instead, the plurality focused the opinion solely on
viability.37
The plurality adopted an “undue burden” standard in place of strict
scrutiny for analyzing abortion restrictions.38 According to the plurality, an
undue burden is one in which the “state regulation has the purpose or effect
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus.”39 This test balances the woman’s liberty interest with
the state’s interests in protecting the woman’s health and preserving the
potentiality of life.40 Applying the undue burden test, the Court ultimately
upheld four of the five challenged restrictions,41 characterizing only the law’s
requirement that married women notify their husbands of their intended
abortions as an undue burden.42

33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
34. Id. at 843. Only Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C and VI constitute a majority. Id. at 843–44.
35. Id. at 846.
36. Id. at 872–73 (plurality opinion) (“A framework of this rigidity was unnecessary and in its
later interpretation sometimes contradicted the State’s permissible exercise of its powers. . . . We
reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of the essential holding of
Roe.”). The Court defined the three-part central holding of Roe as: (1) women have the right to
abort a non-viable fetus without undue state interference; (2) states may restrict abortion once the
viability point has been reached, as long as the restrictions do not prohibit abortions necessary to
protect the life or health of the pregnant woman; and (3) for the duration of the pregnancy, the state’s
interests in protecting the health of the pregnant woman and preserving the fetus’s potentiality of
life are legitimate. Id. at 846.
37. Id. at 878.
38. Id. at 876. Justice O’Connor had previously articulated this standard in her dissent in City
of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health. 462 U.S. 416, 462–63 (1983) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
39. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion).
40. Id. at 877–78.
41. This case concerned five provisions of Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act of 1982. Id.
at 844 (majority opinion). The Court upheld the following four provisions: (1) that a woman seeking
an abortion must give informed consent; (2) that a woman seeking an abortion receive certain statepublished information at least twenty-four hours before undergoing the procedure, effectively
creating a twenty-four-hour delay; (3) that a minor seeking an abortion must first obtain the
informed consent of her parents or a judge; and (4) that abortion providers comply with certain
records and reporting requirements. Id. at 887, 895, 899, 901.
42. Id. at 895. Justice Stevens defended Roe’s trimester framework and preferred a broader
undue burden test. Id. at 914 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
additionally would have held the provision requiring pregnant women seeking an abortion to wait
twenty-four hours while considering state-published information unconstitutional. Id. at 918.
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B. Abortion Rights Analysis in the Twenty-First Century
After Casey, the Court’s abortion jurisprudence primarily concerned
specific restrictions on abortion, rather than the existence of the right to have
one at all.43 In Stenberg v. Carhart,44 the Supreme Court struck down a
Nebraska law that imposed criminal penalties on physicians conducting
dilation and evacuation (“D&E”) abortions45 as a violation of a woman’s
right to an abortion as articulated in Roe and Casey.46 Lawmakers began
facing public pressure to ban intact D&E abortions after a physician’s
description of the procedure circulated into the political sphere.47
Subsequently, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003,
which imposed criminal penalties on doctors who intentionally performed
intact D&E procedures.48 The Act did not include an exception in cases
where an intact D&E abortion was necessary for the pregnant woman’s
health.49
The Court upheld the federal act in Gonzales v. Carhart, relying on
Congress’s factual findings and language differences between the federal act
and the Nebraska act.50 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded

Justice Blackmun, who authored the Court’s Roe opinion, defended Roe’s trimester framework. Id.
at 930 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
He would have applied traditional strict scrutiny in this case to invalidate all five of the challenged
restrictions. Id. at 934. Chief Justice Rehnquist would have overruled Roe outright, disagreeing
that the right to an abortion is a fundamental right encompassed in the right to privacy guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). He criticized the Court’s adoption of a new test and instead
would have used rational basis review to uphold each of the challenged restrictions. Id. at 966, 979.
Justice Scalia also rejected the existence of a constitutional right to an abortion outright. Id. at 979
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
43. See infra Section I.B.
44. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
45. There are two types of D&E procedures: standard and intact. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 137 (2007). Intact D&E abortions differ from standard D&E abortions in that intact D&Es
involve a physician “extract[ing] the fetus intact or largely intact with only a few passes” through
the cervix. Id. at 136. When performing standard D&Es, on the other hand, physicians use surgical
instruments to dismember the fetus within the uterus, which then necessitates more passes through
the cervix than an intact D&E procedure requires. Id. Anti-choice advocates refer to intact D&E
abortions as “partial-birth abortions,” a term strategically used to invoke an emotional (and political)
response. See id. at 170 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The term ‘partial-birth abortion’ is neither
recognized in the medical literature nor used by physicians who perform second-trimester
abortions.”); id. at 182 (“Ultimately, the Court admits that ‘moral concerns’ are at work, concerns
that could yield prohibitions on any abortion.”).
46. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 929–30.
47. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 138. As Justice Ginsburg put it, the public outcry stems from the fact
that “a fetus that is not dismembered resembles an infant.” Id. at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 140–41 (majority opinion).
49. Id. at 143.
50. Id. at 141.
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that the law did not impose an undue burden on women seeking abortions.51
The Court noted that its decision in Casey relied on three premises: (1) the
Government has a legitimate interest in regulating the medical profession to
protect the profession’s integrity;52 (2) the state has an interest in preserving
the potentiality of the fetus’s life for the duration of the pregnancy;53 and (3)
the state has an interest in fully informing women who might come to regret
their choice to obtain an abortion.54 According to the Court, the act at issue
in Gonzales furthered these legitimate governmental interests; it did not
intentionally impose a substantial obstacle on women seeking an abortion.55
Further, the evidence that intact D&Es were safer than standard D&Es was,
in the Court’s view, inconclusive,56 and standard D&Es were permitted under
the Act.57 Thus, the Court deferred to Congress, holding that the Act did not
impose an undue burden because it did not have the effect of imposing a
“substantial obstacle in the path of [women] seeking an abortion” 58 and that
an exception to the ban for the health of the pregnant woman was
unnecessary.59

51. Id. at 147.
52. Id. at 157.
53. Id. at 158.
54. Id. at 159–60.
55. Id. at 160.
56. Id. at 163.
57. Id. at 164. But see id. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (highlighting the consensus by
medical authorities with relevant training that an intact D&E was, in fact, sometimes the safest
procedure); id. at 181–82 (noting that the majority’s reasoning does not protect standard D&E
procedures from condemnation and regulation, as the majority claims it does, because both types of
procedures are “‘brutal’”).
58. Id. at 156 (majority opinion) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)).
59. Id. at 166. Justice Thomas concurred but wrote separately to “reiterate [his] view that the
Court’s abortion jurisprudence, including Casey and Roe v. Wade, has no basis in the Constitution.”
Id. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). Justice Ginsburg characterized the
majority’s decision as an “alarming” misapplication of the Casey and Stenberg precedents because
those cases, she noted, require that post-viability regulations of abortion protect the pregnant
woman’s health. Id. at 170 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This law, she wrote, “saves not a single fetus
from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion.” Id. at 181. She also
highlighted that Congress—and the majority—ignored the overwhelming consensus in the relevant
medical field that intact D&E abortions were sometimes medically necessary. Id. at 180 (“The
Court acknowledges some of this evidence . . . , but insists that, because some witnesses disagreed
with [the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists] and other experts’ assessment of
risk, the Act can stand. . . . In this instance, the Court brushes under the rug the District Courts’
well-supported findings that the physicians who testified that intact D&E is never necessary to
preserve the health of a woman had slim authority for their opinions. They had no training for, or
personal experience with, the intact D&E procedure, and many performed abortions only on rare
occasions.”).
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In 2016, the Court again visited the undue burden test in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.60 There, the Court, with Justice Breyer
writing for the majority, struck down two Texas laws, concluding that both
imposed substantial obstacles on women seeking previability abortions
without sufficient medical benefits to justify the laws, thereby imposing
undue burdens on women trying to access abortions.61 The first law required
abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty
miles of the site where the abortion took place.62 The second law required
abortion facilities to meet the standards required of ambulatory surgical
centers.63 Justice Breyer clarified that under the Casey undue burden test,
courts must “consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together
with the benefits those laws confer.”64 Because “there was no significant
health-related problem that the new [admitting-privileges] law helped cure,”
there was no benefit to the law.65 And because the law had the effect of
shuttering a dramatic number of existing abortion facilities,66 the law
imposed a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion. 67
Weighing the lack of benefits against the imposed obstacle, the Court
concluded that the admitting privileges requirement posed an undue burden
in violation of the Constitution.68 Likewise, the Court deemed the surgical
center requirement an undue burden in violation of the Constitution because
the heightened standard was unnecessary, did not benefit patients seeking
abortions,69 and posed a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions by
reducing the number of abortion facilities in the state to single digits. 70
60. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
61. Id. at 2300.
62. Id. Requirements that an abortion provider have admitting privileges purport to “ensure
that women have easy access to a hospital should complications arise during an abortion procedure.”
Id. at 2311. But there is little evidence that such admitting privileges are necessary because
complications from abortions are rare, and even when complications do arise, they very rarely
manifest during an actual procedure. Id.
63. Id. at 2300. Ambulatory surgical center requirements include, inter alia, detailed spatial
dimensions, in-office traffic patterns, staffing requirements, and HVAC requirements. Id. at 2314–
15.
64. Id. at 2309.
65. Id. at 2311.
66. Id. at 2312.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2313.
69. Id. at 2315.
70. Id. at 2316. Justice Ginsburg concurred to emphasize that abortions are often safer than
carrying a fetus to term and that restrictions on abortion most adversely affect vulnerable women.
Id. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Thomas criticized the Court’s articulation of the
undue burden standard as a balancing test of the burdens and benefits of an abortion restriction and
the Court’s conferral of third-party standing on the abortion providers. Id. at 2321–22 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). He characterized the majority opinion as emblematic of just how “unworkable” the
Court’s third-party standing and tiers of scrutiny analyses are. Id. at 2328. In Justice Alito’s view,
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Justice Breyer further clarified the undue burden standard in the recent
June Medical Services LLC v. Russo plurality opinion.71 He explained that
the undue burden test requires courts to independently examine legislative
findings and weigh the benefits of an abortion law as compared to its
burdens.72 The Court thus struck down a Louisiana statute that “is almost
word-for-word identical to Texas’s admitting-privileges law,”73 concluding
the law was an undue burden—and therefore unconstitutional—because it
imposed a substantial obstacle for women seeking an abortion without any
health benefit for the pregnant women.74
Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment, achieving a fiveJustice majority to strike down the law.75 The Chief Justice based his
decision on a substantial obstacle test, believing that Whole Woman’s Health
was wrongly decided but still respecting it as precedent under stare decisis.76
His test eliminates the balancing that the plurality’s test—the test articulated
by the majority in Whole Woman’s Health—requires.77
C. Framework for Constitutional Analysis During a Public Emergency
The Supreme Court has long recognized states’ authority to regulate the
public’s health and safety through their inherent police powers.78 Historically
in public emergencies, including pandemics, states broaden the use of this

not enough women of reproductive age in Texas were affected by these provisions for them to be
considered an undue burden and that there was not enough evidence to conclude that these
provisions had a material impact on access to abortion. Id. at 2343, 2346 (Alito, J., dissenting).
71. 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020). There currently is a circuit split on which test—the undue burden
test or substantial obstacle test—is controlling. Compare Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183, 209 (D. Md. 2020) (holding that the Whole Woman’s
Health undue burden test remained the correct standard because the June Medical plurality and
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in the judgment did not share a “common denominator”
regarding the appropriate standard), with Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2020)
(holding that the substantial obstacle test, favored by Chief Justice Roberts, is the appropriate test
because Chief Justice Roberts’s June Medical concurrence in the judgment was necessary to achieve
a majority). June Medical was decided on June 29, 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic
and after the cases challenging state executive orders discussed below. However, the decision is
still vitally important for understanding how abortion rights jurisprudence might develop in the
future, especially with the marked shift in the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court with Justice
Barrett replacing Justice Ginsburg. See 166 CONG. REC. S6588 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2020)
(confirming the nomination of Amy Coney Barrett to be the Supreme Court).
72. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2112 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2112–13.
75. Id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2135–36. Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh each wrote separate
dissents. See id. at 2142 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2171
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting); id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
78. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
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power.79 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court held that a Massachusetts
law requiring compliance with local ordinances mandating vaccination
against smallpox was constitutional. 80 The Court explained that a state’s
police powers contain authority to enact reasonable regulations to ensure the
public’s health and safety and “to enact quarantine laws and health laws of
every description.”81 The regulations and rules adopted under a state’s police
powers, however, are still subject to the Constitution and “must always yield”
where a state’s police powers conflict with the Constitution’s grant of federal
authority or its conferral of an individual right.82 The Court noted that
individual rights are not absolute; the state is free to reasonably restrict such
rights if the public good so requires.83
Though the federal government must give deference to the states’ police
powers, the Court emphasized that there may be circumstances where a
state’s rules and regulations relating to a public health emergency could be
unreasonable enough to warrant judicial interference.84 Most importantly,
the Jacobson Court held that judicial review during a public health crisis was
limited to those state and local rules that nominally protect public health and
safety, but that, in reality, have “no real or substantial relation to those
objects” or are “a plain, palpable invasion of rights” conferred by the
Constitution.85 Before the COVID-19 pandemic, courts primarily cited
Jacobson to uphold a state’s use of its police power in instances where a state
mandated that individuals suspected of carrying infectious diseases
quarantine86 and where a state required vaccinations for public school
children.87
79. See infra Section I.C.
80. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
81. Id. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 26.
84. Id. at 28.
85. Id. at 31.
86. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1963)
(involving smallpox); Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016) (involving Ebola);
Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973) (involving venereal disease).
87. See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (holding that Jacobson settled that a
state’s police power does, in fact, encompass mandatory vaccination regimes); Phillips v. City of
New York, 775 F.3d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that Jacobson barred substantive due process
challenges to New York’s mandatory vaccine requirement for public school children); Workman v.
Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2011) (relying on Jacobson in
holding that West Virginia’s mandatory vaccine requirement for public school children was not
unconstitutional). Courts have also given deference to states using their police powers in other
emergency situations like hurricanes. Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated
on other grounds by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). For example,
in 1992, Florida residents challenged a curfew put in place by county officials after the governor
declared a state of emergency in the wake of Hurricane Andrew. Id. at 108. The challengers claimed
that the curfew infringed on their constitutional right to travel. Id. at 107. The United States Court
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D. State Executive Orders and Abortion During the COVID-19
Pandemic
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic,88 state governors across the
country issued executive orders postponing non-emergency medical
procedures to preserve hospital capacity and personal protective equipment
(“PPE”) and to curtail spread of the virus.89 Violations of some of these
orders carried criminal penalties.90 Abortion providers in Ohio, Tennessee,
Oklahoma, Alabama, Texas, and Arkansas brought suit in their respective
jurisdictions to limit the scope of their state’s executive order to exclude
abortions.91 In each case, the relevant federal district court temporarily
enjoined enforcement of the order as applied to abortion procedures.92 Three
federal circuits—the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh—ultimately let the district
courts’ rulings stand.93 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits, however, issued
mandamus relief to effectively overrule the district courts in their
jurisdictions.94
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ultimately held that the curfew was constitutional, relying on
precedential cases that have “consistently held it is a proper exercise of police power to respond to
emergency situations with temporary curfews that might curtail the movement of persons who
otherwise would enjoy freedom from restriction.” Id. at 109. More generally, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that in emergency situations, “governing authorities must be granted the proper deference and
wide latitude necessary for dealing with the emergency.” Id.
88. COVID-19, the serious respiratory disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, rapidly
spread across the United States (and the world) in the spring of 2020 through person-to-person
transmission. Preterm-Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., 456 F. Supp. 3d 917, 920 (S.D. Ohio 2020). Efforts
to curb infections of COVID-19 include maintaining at least a six-foot distance from other
individuals and, especially for healthcare workers, donning personal protective equipment (“PPE”)
like masks, face shield, and gloves. Id. As the virus gained traction in the United States, healthcare
facilities faced a shortage of such PPE. Id.
89. Pre-Term Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 20-3365, 2020 WL 1673310, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 6,
2020); Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 918 (6th Cir. 2020); S. Wind Women’s Ctr.
LLC v. Stitt, 808 F. App’x 677, 679 (10th Cir. 2020); Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1174
(11th Cir. 2020); In re Abbott (Abbott II), 954 F.3d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 2020); In re Rutledge, 956
F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 2020).
90. See, e.g., Slatery, 956 F.3d at 919; Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott (Abbott
III), No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 U.S. Dist. WL 1815587, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020) (noting
the criminal penalties for violating the respective state emergency order), vacated in part sub nom.
In re Abbott (Abbott VI), 956 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2020).
91. Pre-Term Cleveland, 2020 WL 1673310, at *1; Slatery, 956 F.3d at 919; Stitt, 808 F. App’x
at 680; Robinson, 957 F. 3d at 1175; Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott (Abbott I), 450
F. Supp. 3d 753, 755 (W.D. Tex. 2020); Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1025.
92. Preterm-Cleveland, 456 F. Supp. 3d at 939; Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 455 F. Supp.
3d. 619, 629 (M.D. Tenn. 2020), aff’d as modified, 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020); S. Wind Women’s
Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1231 (W.D. Okla. 2020); Robinson v. Marshall, 454 F.
Supp. 3d 1188, 1206 (M.D. Ala. 2020); Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *7; Little Rock Fam. Plan.
Servs. v. Rutledge, 454 F. Supp. 3d 821, 834–35 (E.D. Ark. 2020), order vacated in part, No. 4:19cv-00449, 2020 WL 2079224 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 22, 2020).
93. See infra Section I.D.1.
94. See infra Section I.D.2.
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1. Some Jurisdictions Limited the Scope of State Executive Orders,
Rendering Them Inapplicable to Abortion Procedures.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits each upheld their respective district courts’ enjoinment of the
respective state executive orders as applied to abortion procedures.95
i. Sixth Circuit
On March 17, 2020, the Ohio Department of Health issued an order
postponing all non-emergency procedures that required PPE use and
imposing criminal sanctions on those who disobeyed the order.96 On March
20 and 21, Ohio officials sent abortion providers letters threatening to take
action if the providers did not cease performing abortions in compliance with
the order.97 The providers brought suit, seeking a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”),98 which the district court partially granted about ten days later.99
When Ohio moved to stay the TRO pending appeal, the Sixth Circuit held
that it lacked jurisdiction over the State’s interlocutory appeal.100 The district
court’s injunction as applied to abortion procedures remained intact—
meaning abortions in Ohio could continue as usual.101
The Sixth Circuit later issued a similar opinion on a second case arising
out of an analogous state order from Tennessee.102 In holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the Tennessee executive order,
the court noted that absent a pandemic, the executive order’s three-week
prohibition on procedural abortions103 would clearly constitute a substantial
95. See infra Sections I.D.1.i–iii.
96. Pre-Term Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 20-3365, 2020 WL 1673310, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 6,
2020).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id.
102. Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 918 (6th Cir. 2020). On April 8, 2020,
Governor Lee of Tennessee issued an executive order postponing all “surgical and invasive
procedures that are elective and non-urgent” until the order expired on April 30. Id. (quoting Tenn.
Exec. Order No. 25 (April 8, 2020), https://publications.tnsosfiles.com/pub/execorders/exec-orderslee25.pdf). The order did not allow health professionals to perform procedures that, in their
professional judgment, would not counteract the executive order’s purpose. Id. at 918–19. Abortion
providers challenged the executive order on substantive due process grounds as applied specifically
to procedural abortions because the parties in this case stipulated that the executive order did not
apply to medication abortions. Id. at 919–20. State officials conceded that the order imposed
criminal penalties on abortion providers who performed procedural abortions during the three-week
duration of the executive order, except in extreme circumstances. Id. at 919.
103. Procedural abortions, also referred to as surgical abortions, include aspiration abortions
(where the embryo or fetus is sucked out of the uterus through the cervix using a vacuum) and D&E
abortions, both of which take place in out-patient clinical settings. Id. at 917. Medication abortions,
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obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion and would therefore be
unconstitutional as an undue burden under Casey.104 Under the Jacobson
framework, the court reasoned, the executive order, for some women at least,
“constitute[d] ‘beyond question a plain, palpable invasion’” of their
fundamental right to a previability abortion, despite the deference afforded to
Tennessee.105 The court did, however, limit the scope of the preliminary
injunction.106 Almost a year later, the Supreme Court summarily granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the Sixth Circuit to vacate
its expired order granting the preliminary injunction as moot.107
ii. Tenth Circuit
Similarly, Governor Kevin Stitt of Oklahoma issued an executive order
on March 24, 2020, mandating the delay of “all elective surgeries, minor
medical procedures, and non-emergency dental procedures,”108 including all
abortions not specifically defined as a medical emergency by Oklahoma
statute or abortions not necessary to preserve the pregnant woman’s life.109
The district court enjoined enforcement of the executive order as it pertained
to all medication abortions and all surgical abortions for patients who would
be unable to obtain a legal abortion before the expiration of the executive
order.110 In a per curiam opinion, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the state
officials’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction.111

used in the earliest weeks of a pregnancy, involve ingesting medications that shed the uterine lining
to end the pregnancy. Medical Versus Surgical Abortion, UNIV. OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH,
https://www.ucsfhealth.org/education/medical-versus-surgical-abortion.
104. Slatery, 956 F.3d at 929. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit held (1) that the abortion providers
were likely to succeed on the merits of their substantive due process claim; (2) that the abortion
providers and their patients were likely to suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction were
not granted; (3) that the balance of equities weighs in the abortion providers’ favor; and (4) that the
injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 924, 927–29.
105. Id. at 926 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)).
106. Id. at 929–30. The court limited the order’s application to only the three categories of
women who would be adversely affected by the executive order: (1) women who would likely be
unable to obtain an abortion at all if their procedures were delayed until the expiration of the
executive order; (2) women who would likely face more intrusive procedures if their procedures
were delayed until the expiration of the executive order; and (3) women who would likely
specifically have to undergo a two-day procedure if their procedures were delayed until the
expiration of the executive order. Id.
107. Slatery v. Adams & Boyle, P.C., 141 S. Ct. 1262, 1263 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2021), vacating as
moot 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020).
108. S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, 808 F. App’x 677, 679 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Okla.
Exec. Order 2020-07, Am. No. 4, ¶ 18). The executive order initially imposed a deadline of April
7, 2020, but it was later extended to April 30. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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iii. Eleventh Circuit
Alabama issued a similar order postponing all medical procedures that
were not immediately medically necessary because of an emergency for
several weeks.112 Abortion providers sought confirmation that their clinics
would not be subject to the order.113 Alabama officials vacillated on their
interpretation of the scope of the order, so the district court granted the
abortion providers a preliminary injunction, enjoining the enforcement of the
order as applied to abortion providers who, in their professional medical
judgment, believed their patients must go forward with their abortion
procedures or else lose their legal rights.114 Relying on Jacobson, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
enjoining enforcement of the order.115 The court noted that, within the
Jacobson framework, neither the individual’s right to terminate a pregnancy
nor the state’s police powers were unlimited.116
2. Other Jurisdictions Maintained the Restrictions on Abortion.
Other circuits took different approaches. Though both district courts in
Texas and Arkansas enjoined enforcement of their respective state’s
executive order as applied to abortions, both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
used mandamus relief to effectively overrule the district courts.117
i. Fifth Circuit
Like the governors mentioned above, Texas Governor Greg Abbott
issued executive order GA-09 on March 22, 2020, postponing non-essential
medical procedures,118 which the state interpreted to include limitations on

112. Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2020). After Governor Kay Ivey
of Alabama declared a state of emergency on March 13, 2020, the Alabama State Health Officer
issued an order on March 27, 2020. Id. The order was initially active until April 17, 2020 but was
later extended until April 30, 2020. Id.
113. Id. at 1174–75.
114. Id. at 1176.
115. Id. at 1174, 1179.
116. Id. at 1179–80.
117. See infra Sections I.D.2.i–ii.
118. Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 2020). The order postponed “all surgeries and
procedures that are not immediately medically necessary to correct a serious medical condition of,
or to preserve the life of, a patient who without immediate performance of the surgery or procedure
would be at risk for serious adverse medical consequences or death, as determined by the patient’s
physician” until April 21, 2020 at 11:59 PM. Tex. Exec. Order No. GA-09 (Mar. 22, 2020),
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA_09_COVID-19_hospital_capacity_IMAGE_0322-2020.pdf. Excepted from the order was “any procedure that, if performed in accordance with
the commonly accepted standard of clinical practice, would not deplete the hospital capacity or the
personal protective equipment needed to cope with the COVID-19 disaster.” Id.
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abortions.119 Abortion providers in the state brought suit challenging the
executive order on substantive due process grounds.120 On March 30, the
district court issued a TRO against the executive order as applied to abortion
procedures.121 State officials subsequently sought an emergency stay of the
order and a writ of mandamus—a type of relief used only in “exceptional
circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power . . . or a clear
abuse of discretion”122—from the Fifth Circuit to vacate the district court’s
TRO.123 The Fifth Circuit ultimately partially granted the Texas officials’
writ of mandamus and directed the district court to vacate the TRO,124 letting
the temporary abortion ban stand except for one narrow exception.125
The Fifth Circuit held that mandamus relief was warranted because the
district court failed to follow the Fifth Circuit’s Abbott II mandate, requiring
the district court to evaluate GA-09 within the Jacobson framework.126 The
Fifth Circuit also held that the district court’s ruling was “patently erroneous”
and abused its discretion for several reasons.127 It “usurped the state’s

119. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 792 n.25.
120. Abbott I, 450 F. Supp. 3d 753, 755 (W.D. Tex. 2020). On March 29, 2020, however, the
Texas Medical Board clarified that “‘the prohibition does not apply to office-based visits without
surgeries or procedures’” and that a “‘procedure’ does not include physical examinations, noninvasive diagnostic tests, the performing of lab tests, or obtaining specimens to perform laboratory
tests.” Abbott III, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 U.S. Dist. WL 1815587, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9,
2020), vacated in part sub nom. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Texas Medical
Board (TMB) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Regarding Non-Urgent Elective Surgeries and
Procedures During Texas Disaster Declaration for COVID-19 Pandemic, TEX. MED. BD. (Mar. 29,
2020), https://med.uth.edu/ortho/wp-content/uploads/sites/60/2020/03/TMB-COVID-19-ElectiveSurgery-FAQs-Updated-20200329.pdf).
121. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 778.
122. Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).
Mandamus relief can be used “to restrain a lower court when its actions would threaten the
separation of powers by embarrass[ing] the executive arm of the Government, . . . or result in the
intrusion by the federal judiciary on the delicate area of federal-state relations.” Id. at 381 (alteration
in original) (internal quotations omitted).
123. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 779.
124. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 704.
125. The Fifth Circuit permitted the part of the April 9 TRO restraining enforcement of GA-09
for “patients ‘who, based on the treating physician’s medical judgment, would be past the legal limit
for an abortion in Texas—[twenty-two]-weeks LMP—on April 22, 2020.’” Id. (quoting Abbott III,
2020 WL 1815587, at *7).
126. Id. at 710.
127. Id. at 713. Citing inadequacy of the record, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district
court abused its discretion in exempting medication abortions from GA-09 for the following
reasons: (1) the district court failed to consider PPE usage and standard of care in medication
abortions during the pandemic (as opposed to during normal times), id. at 714; (2) the district court
usurped state officials’ authority to enact policy to protect the public during a public health crisis,
id. at 716; and (3) the district court failed to “carefully parse record evidence”—as mandated by
Abbott II—and failed to cite any evidence submitted by state officials in the TRO, id. at 718.
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authority to craft emergency public health measures,” justifying mandamus
relief.128
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court’s TRO patently erred
by exempting patients who would reach eighteen weeks since their last
menstrual period (“LMP”)129 before the expiration of GA-09 and whose
doctors determined would be unlikely to obtain an abortion before reaching
Texas’s twenty-two weeks LMP limitation on abortion.130 In the court’s
view, the district court’s characterization of GA-09 as a categorical ban on
abortion for these patients in violation of Casey was “obviously wrong.”131
Despite hesitation, the Fifth Circuit noted that the district court did not
patently err by exempting patients who would reach twenty-two weeks LMP
before the expiration of GA-09.132 Lastly, the Fifth Circuit held that state
officials had met the remaining burdens for mandamus relief, concluding that
the state officials had no other adequate means of relief and that the
extraordinary circumstances of this case justified mandamus as a remedy.133
In dissent, Judge Dennis accused the majority of “simply disagree[ing]
with the district court’s decisions on matters that are squarely within its
discretion” and misappropriating mandamus as a form of relief.134 Judge
Dennis emphasized that mandamus is a unique form of relief only to be used
“in ‘exceptional circumstances,’” not merely when the appellate court
disagrees with the lower court or even when the lower court errs.135 Because
he and judges in other circuits reached different conclusions, Judge Dennis
wrote that the state officials necessarily did not meet the “clear and
indisputable” requirements for mandamus relief.136
In the dissent’s view, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the
district court to find that enforcement of GA-09 on all the types of abortion
at issue was not substantially related to protecting public health and that such
enforcement infringed on Texas patients’ constitutional right to an abortion

128. Id. at 713.
129. Medical professionals calculate gestational age based on how many weeks have passed
since the first day of a patient’s last menstrual period, rather than the date of conception. Anne
Davis, How Doctors Date Pregnancies, Explained, REWIRE NEWS GROUP (Oct. 17, 2013, 9:12
AM),
https://rewirenewsgroup.com/article/2013/10/17/whats-in-a-week-pregnancy-datingstandards-and-what-they-mean/.
130. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d. at 721.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 722.
133. Id. at 723.
134. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 724 (Dennis, J., dissenting in part).
135. Id. at 726 (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380).
136. Id. (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81); see also supra Section I.D.1 (discussing the
federal circuits reaching the opposite conclusion as the Fifth Circuit did here).
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under the Jacobson framework.137 Based on the plain meaning of the
executive order, the dissent inferred that “the enforcement against abortion
providers more generally is pretextual and motivated by hostility to abortion
rights.”138 The Supreme Court, nearly a year later, granted certiorari, vacated
the judgment, and remanded the case so that the Fifth Circuit could dismiss
the case as moot.139
ii. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit approached the as-applied challenges to Arkansas’s
directive postponing non-emergency medical procedures similarly, which
applied to surgical abortions, but not medication abortions.140 After the
district court enjoined enforcement of the directive as applied to surgical
abortions,141 the Eighth Circuit, relying explicitly on the Fifth Circuit’s
Abbott II reasoning, granted Arkansas’s petition for mandamus relief.142 The
Eighth Circuit concluded that because the abortion providers challenged the
directive in a supplemental complaint as part of litigation already pending
(rather than initiating new, separate litigation), the State had no other means
of relief.143 Using reasoning similar to the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit
maintained that the district court abused its discretion in deeming its decision
consistent with Jacobson because it did not apply the Jacobson framework
sufficiently, leading to “patently erroneous results.”144

137. Id. at 733–34. The district court specifically found: (1) that suspending medication
abortions under GA-09 does not conserve PPE nor hospital capacity and (2) that GA-09 provided
no net benefit in prohibiting patients who would reach eighteen weeks LMP and be unlikely to
obtain an abortion before the 22-week cutoff according to their doctors from receiving medication
abortions. Id. at 737–39.
138. Id. at 735.
139. Slatery v. Adams & Boyle, P.C., 141 S. Ct. 1262, 1263 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2021), vacating as
moot 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020).
140. See In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1025 (8th Cir. 2020) (relying on the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning in Abbott II). On March 11, 2020, Governor Asa Hutchinson of Arkansas declared a state
of emergency and issued Executive Order 20-03, giving the Arkansas Department of Health
authority to do “everything reasonably possible to respond to and recover from the COVID-19
virus.” Id. at 1023. On April 3, 2020, the Arkansas Department of Health issued a directive
postponing all surgeries deemed not medically necessary by a patient’s doctor. Id. The directive
did not contain an expiration date but could only endure as long as the duration of the state of
emergency, which, unless extended by the Governor, was capped at sixty days by Arkansas law.
Id. at 1024.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020)).
143. Id. at 1026–27.
144. Id. at 1028.
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E. Litigation Challenging Medication Abortion Requirements in the
District of Maryland
Abortion litigation during the COVID-19 pandemic has not only arisen
because of state emergency orders. Some abortion advocates have also
brought suit challenging the requirements that, before a patient receives a
medication abortion, the patient must sign an agreement in front of the
prescribing physician in person and the physician must dispense the abortioninducing drug in person (rather than through a retail or mail-order
pharmacy).145 On May 27, 2020, abortion providers brought suit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland to enjoin the United States Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) from applying these in-person
requirements for medication abortions during the pandemic.146 The abortion
providers argued that such requirements unconstitutionally infringed upon
the right to an abortion, and that the requirements violated the Equal
Protection Clause.147
The district court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction and,
using the Whole Woman’s Health balancing test analysis,148 held that
abortion providers were likely to succeed in their claim that it was
unconstitutional to enforce in-person requirements for medication
abortions.149 The burdens imposed by the in-person requirements, including
difficulty travelling to an appropriate clinic and risk of infection for a
medication abortion, constitute a substantial obstacle in the path of women
seeking an abortion.150 The benefits of the requirement, that the doctor can
assess and counsel the patient in person151 and that the patient is less likely to
face a delay by receiving the medication in person,152 can be adequately
remedied without the in-person requirements during the pandemic through
telemedicine.153 The Fourth Circuit denied the FDA’s motion for stay

145. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183, 191 (D. Md.
2020).
146. Id. at 197.
147. Id.
148. This district court maintained that the undue burden balancing test articulated in Whole
Woman’s Health was the appropriate standard, even after June Medical, because, in that case, the
plurality and Roberts’s concurrence in the judgment did not share a “common denominator”
regarding the appropriate standard. Id. at 209. But see Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 915 (8th
Cir. 2020) (holding that the constitutional standard for abortion laws going forward is a substantial
obstacle test because Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in the judgment was necessary to achieve
a majority, so his opinion is controlling).
149. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 224.
150. Id. at 216.
151. Id. at 219–20.
152. Id. at 220.
153. Id. at 222.
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pending appeal on August 13, 2020.154 In January, 2021, the Supreme Court
stayed the injunction pending disposition of the appeal in the Fourth Circuit,
allowing the FDA to continue enforcing the in-person requirements.155 Three
months later, the FDA changed course, announcing it would cease enforcing
both the in-person dispensing and signature requirements for the duration of
the pandemic.156
II. ANALYSIS
During the COVID-19 pandemic, states used their broad police powers
to employ a variety of tactics to stop the spread of the virus.157 Some of these
tactics infringed upon citizens’ civil liberties, including the right to have an
abortion.158 As states used their emergency orders to delay abortions by
characterizing them as “non-essential” or “elective” procedures, courts
looked to Jacobson v. Massachusetts for guidance.159 Section II.A argues
that federal courts improperly used the Jacobson framework both
normatively and descriptively to uphold state emergency orders that
temporarily banned abortion during the COVID-19 pandemic.160 Section
II.B explores how the state orders restricting access to abortion in the name
of public health mirror frequent anti-abortion attacks on abortion rights, like
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (“TRAP”) laws. 161 Section II.C
then considers how these orders and the cases upholding them as applied to
abortions may inform how abortion rights are treated farther along in the
pandemic or even afterwards.162
A. Using the Jacobson framework to suspend judicial review of
abortion restrictions is both normatively and descriptively
incorrect.
Courts that both upheld and struck down temporary abortion bans
resulting from state emergency orders all invoked Jacobson to some degree

154. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, No. 20-1824 (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2020)
(order denying motion for stay pending appeal).
155. FDA v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, No. 20A34 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2021).
156. Joint Motion to Hold Appeals in Abeyance 1, 7, ECF No. 103, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists v. FDA, No. 20-1824 (4th Cir. Apr. 13, 2021).
157. See supra Section I.D.
158. See generally Jeffrey D. Jackson, Tiered Scrutiny in a Pandemic, 12 CONLAWNOW 39
(2020) (discussing how constitutional analysis has played out with respect to other civil liberties
like limitations on gatherings, firearms sales, religious services, and businesses).
159. See supra Section I.D.
160. See infra Section II.A.
161. See infra Section II.B.
162. See infra Section II.C.

2021]

“TRAPPED” IN A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

781

in their analyses.163 Courts that upheld the abortion bans viewed Jacobson
as granting exceptional deference to the states.164 This framework, however,
is both normatively and descriptively incorrect.165 This sort of suspension of
judicial review is normatively improper because the courts are a necessary
check on the states’ exercise of police powers—including and especially
during an emergency health crisis.166 The Jacobson framework adopted by
these courts is also descriptively improper because Jacobson did not establish
a different standard of judicial review.167
1. Suspension of judicial review under the Jacobson framework is
normatively improper.
Since Marbury v. Madison,168 judicial review over government action
has been a foundational aspect of constitutional analysis.169 Legal scholars,
however, have long criticized courts’ apparent suspension of judicial review
during times of crisis.170 Under this “suspension” model, courts apply a lower
level of scrutiny to a constitutional challenge or only nominally apply the
designated tier of scrutiny while in actuality applying a much less rigorous
standard.171 Suspension of judicial review allows the government to curtail
access to abortion with little pushback.172 When judicial review is suspended,
the political branches do not need to be transparent nor must they tailor the
means of implementing their policies.173 Courts upholding the bans have
claimed to be concerned with lower courts second-guessing state authority
during a public health emergency.174 The higher deference some courts have
interpreted Jacobson as requiring effectively eliminates the judicial power to
review legislative findings as Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
requires.175

163. See supra Section I.D.
164. See supra Section I.D.2.
165. See infra Sections II.A.1–2.
166. See infra Section II.A.1.
167. See infra Section II.A.2.
168. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
169. Id. at 177.
170. See David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in
Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2568 (2003) (“The conventional wisdom is that courts are
ineffective as guardians of liberty when the general public is clamoring for security.”).
171. Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The
Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 182 (2020).
172. Id. at 195.
173. Id.
174. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696, 716 (5th Cir. 2020).
175. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016).
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The states’ mitigation efforts to curb the spread of the virus—”flattening
the curve”—required extending the duration of emergency orders. 176 As
such, the suspension of judicial review could last an indeterminate amount of
time.177 As of February 2021, a year after the pandemic broke out in the
United States—and about a year after Ohio, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Alabama,
Texas, and Arkansas issued executive orders postponing nonemergency
surgeries—every state in the Union save one remained under some sort of
public health emergency order.178 Texas repeatedly extended its initial
emergency order declared on March 13, 2020.179 Indeed, the state of
emergency lasted longer than an entire pregnancy carried to term.180
Suspending ordinary judicial review supposedly for a temporary duration,
but in reality for an indefinite duration, is the “exception [that] swallow[s]
the rule.”181
The Jacobson framework gives judges a mechanism to uphold bans they
agree with politically.182 By assuming, as some courts have, that all abortions
are elective rather than medically necessary, those courts have also been able
to characterize abortion providers as demanding exceptional treatment.183 At
176. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 703; Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 187.
177. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 187.
178. Each State’s COVID-19 Reopening and Reclosing Plans and Mask Requirements, NAT’L
ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.nashp.org/governors-prioritizehealth-for-all/ (maintaining continuously updated records of current state emergency orders across
the United States). Michigan was the only state no longer under a state of emergency because, in
October 2020, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that Governor Gretchen Whitmer did not have
the authority to unilaterally extend the state of emergency past the initial April 30, 2020, expiration
date. Jason Slotkin, Michigan Supreme Court Rules Against Governor’s Emergency Powers, NPR
(Oct.
3,
2020,
3:14
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/10/03/919891538/michigan-supreme-court-rules-against-governors-emergencypowers.
179. 46 Tex. Reg. 889 (Feb. 5, 2021).
180. The state of emergency was still in effect as of February 2021, eleven months after
Governor Abbott initially declared the emergency. Id. The Texas executive order challenged in
Abbott was superseded by GA-15 on April 22, 2020, which contained an exception that allowed
plaintiff abortion providers to continue performing abortions. State Defendants’ Supplemental
Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 8, Abbott III, 450 F. Supp. 3d 753
(2020) (No. 1:20-cv-00323-LY), 2020 WL 2702292. Texas officials abandoned the temporary
abortion ban. Id. These restrictions that initiated the litigation have since been lifted but may return
if cases of COVID-19 surge. B. Jessie Hill, Essentially Elective: The Law and Ideology of
Restricting Abortion During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 106 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 110 (2020).
181. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 187.
182. Id. at 191.
183. See Hill, supra note 180, at 117 (“Differential treatment of abortion providers is normalized
by the stigma that permeates abortion provision, treats abortion services as outside of mainstream
health care, and assumes almost all abortions are, by default, elective. Thus, the providers’ requests
to be allowed to make their own determinations whether a particular surgery for a particular patient
qualified as essential and non-elective were cast by states, and some courts, as requests for ‘blanket
exemption[s].’” (quoting Pre-Term Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 20-3365, 2020 WL 1673310, at *3
(6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2020))). See also In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1032 (8th Cir. 2020)
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the same time, dissenting judges have criticized their colleagues for
abdicating their impartial role when it comes to abortion-related cases.184
Abortion occupies a unique position in constitutional analysis;185 few other
medical procedures are attacked with such regularity and animosity. 186
For example, the Texas executive order resulted in two appeals to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.187 The first time, the
Fifth Circuit held that the district court had not properly applied the Jacobson
framework, which it interpreted as requiring that only those public health
measures that have “no real or substantial relation to [the public health
objectives], or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law” could be struck down and remanded.188
When the district court again used the Jacobson framework to strike down
the abortion ban, the Fifth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus to overturn that
ruling—a form of relief appropriate “only in ‘exceptional circumstances
amounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of
discretion.’”189 As Judge Dennis notes in his dissent, other courts around the
country have disagreed with the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, indicating that the
district court could not have clearly abused its discretion.190 In its initial
mandate, the Fifth Circuit even directed the district court to “inquire whether
Texas has exploited the present crisis as a pretext to target abortion providers
sub silentio.”191 The district court went on to find that the medical benefits
of an abortion ban were limited, especially for medication abortions.192

(characterizing the district court’s injunction of the executive order as applied to abortion providers
as “effectively . . . ’a blanket exemption from a generally-applicable emergency public health
measure . . . .’” (quoting Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772, 795 (5th Cir. 2020))).
184. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696, 725 (5th Cir. 2020) (Dennis, J., dissenting in part) (“I again echo
the words of a colleague in dissent in a case now before the United States Supreme Court: ‘It is
apparent that when abortion comes on stage it shadows the rule of settled judicial rules.’” (quoting
June Med. Servs. LLC v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 816 (5th Cir. 2018) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting),
rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020)).
185. Pre-Term Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 20-3365, 2020 WL 1673310, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 6,
2020) (Bush, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
187. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 703. The Eighth Circuit adopted the same reasoning as the Fifth
Circuit. Rutledge, 956 F. 3d at 1025.
188. Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772, 784 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)).
189. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 707 (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc. 545 F.3d 304, 309 (5th
Cir. 2008)).
190. Id. at 726 (Dennis, J., dissenting in part).
191. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 792.
192. Abbott III, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 WL 1815587, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020)
(finding that “[p]roviding medication abortion does not require the use of any PPE”); id. at *5
(finding that applying the executive order to abortions will not further the executive order’s goals
because it “will not conserve PPE” and “will not conserve hospital resources” and finding that
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Relying on these findings, the district court ruled that the executive order as
applied to abortions did not bear a real or substantial relation to the public
health emergency and thus remained unconstitutional even under the
Jacobson framework.193
Scholars have also argued that ordinary judicial review during a
pandemic is necessary to cultivate a robust and appropriate response to both
the continuing COVID-19 pandemic and other public health crises in the
future.194 The threat of defending its policies in court under ordinary judicial
scrutiny “force[s] the government to do its homework—to communicate not
only the purpose of its actions, but also how the imposed restrictions actually
relate to and further those purposes.”195 Under ordinary judicial review,
courts would explain the states’ emergency response reasoning in a precise
manner that would then have precedential value for future emergencies.196
Such a requirement for transparent and reasoned pandemic policies from
government officials could lead to more effective responses to public health
crises in general.197
2. Courts upholding abortion bans during the pandemic have
applied Jacobson incorrectly as a descriptive matter because
Jacobson did not articulate a new framework of constitutional
analysis during times of emergencies.
Jacobson has been invoked by every court that has reviewed a
temporary abortion ban imposed by a state responding to the COVID-19

“[p]hysicians are continuing to provide [other] obstetrical and gynecological procedures comparable
to abortion in PPE use or time-sensitivity, based on their professional medical judgment”).
193. Id. at *6.
194. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 194–95.
195. Lindsay F. Wiley & Steve Vladeck, COVID-19 Reinforces the Argument for “Regular”
Judicial Review—Not Suspension of Civil Liberties—In Times of Crisis, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Apr.
9, 2020), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/covid-19-reinforces-the-argument-for-regular-judicialreview-not-suspension-of-civil-liberties-in-times-of-crisis/.
196. See Cole, supra note 170, at 2566 (“Because emergency measures frequently last well
beyond the de facto end of the emergency, and because the wheels of justice move slowly, courts
often have an opportunity to assess the validity of emergency measures after the emergency has
passed, when passions have been reduced and reasoned judgment is more attainable. In doing so,
courts have at least sometimes been able to take advantage of hindsight to pronounce certain
emergency measures invalid for infringing constitutional rights. And because courts, unlike the
political branches or the political culture more generally, must explain their reasons in a formal
manner that then has precedential authority in future disputes, judicial decisions offer an opportunity
to set the terms of the next crisis, even if they often come too late to be of much assistance in the
immediate term.”).
197. See Amanda Mull, The Difference Between Feeling Safe and Being Safe, ATLANTIC (Oct.
26, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/10/pandemic-safety-america/616858/
(noting that mixed messages from government officials fuel the general public’s misunderstanding
of how to combat the coronavirus and can lead to greater frequency of risky behaviors).
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pandemic.198 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits
both held that Jacobson did not impose a new framework of constitutional
analysis but must instead be considered together with the standard for
abortion-related challenges in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey and Whole Woman’s Health.199 On the other hand,
the purported Jacobson test requires, according to the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits, that district courts ask only whether the burdens imposed on
abortion by a state’s executive order are substantially related to the public
health emergency or whether the order’s burdens “‘beyond question’ exceed
its benefits.”200
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits are correct.201 Jacobson does not
establish a new standard of review.202 The Jacobson Court used a balancing
test based on reasonableness of the state’s use of its police powers.203 In
Abbott II, the Fifth Circuit interpreted this to mean that, in the context of
abortion restrictions during a public health emergency, rationality review
replaces heightened scrutiny.204 But the Jacobson Court’s definition of what
is “reasonable” more closely mirrors heightened scrutiny than the Court’s
later interpretation of what is “reasonable” under rationality review.205 Even
if Jacobson does establish a new standard of review during a public health
crisis, it is not a more deferential one.206 Jacobson was decided in 1905 two
months before Lochner v. New York207—before the development of modern

198. See supra Section I.D.
199. Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 927 (6th Cir. 2020); Robinson v. Att’y Gen.,
957 F.3d 1171, 1182–83 (11th Cir. 2020).
200. Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772, 790 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 31 (1905)).
201. Slatery, 956 F.3d at 927; Robinson, 957 F.3d at 1182–83. See also Hill, supra note 180, at
108 (explaining that both the Jacobson standard and the undue burden test of Casey and Whole
Woman’s Health require courts to balance the state’s interest against individual liberties); Wiley &
Vladeck, supra note 171, at 190 (explaining that “Jacobson adopted a quintessential balancing
test”).
202. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 190.
203. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28.
204. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 784–85; Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696, 704–5 (5th Cir. 2020).
205. Compare Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28 (“[The] acknowledged power of a local community to
protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all[] might be exercised in particular
circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or
might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or
compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.”), with Williamson v. Lee Optical,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“But the law need not be in every respect logically consistent
with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
206. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 191.
207. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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constitutional scrutiny analysis and fundamental rights jurisprudence.208 As
such, Jacobson cannot function as an exception to either subsequent
jurisprudential tradition.209 The Jacobson rule acknowledges that state
political branches must have leeway to enact reasonable policies in response
to a public health crisis, but the rule “is not one of categorical deference to a
state’s political decisions.”210 One scholar characterized Jacobson as
imposing limitations on the state’s police power, rather than granting it
deference.211
The circumstances of a pandemic fit squarely into ordinary judicial
scrutiny analysis.212 During a public health crisis, the government’s attempts
to control the spread of virus and to diminish the level of emergency for the
public become increasingly compelling.213 Indeed, the undue burden test for
the abortion right is likewise proportional.214 The purported benefits of a
state’s executive order banning abortions for a period of time during a health
crisis will likely weigh more heavily than the purported benefits of other state
laws implicating the abortion right. 215 The undue burden test already takes
the context of a pandemic into account.216
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Jacobson was cited often in the
context of quarantined individuals suspected of carrying and potentially
transmitting infectious diseases.217 In United States ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick,
208. See id. at 64 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the freedom of contract,
beginning the since-rejected doctrine of economic due process); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting a need for heightened scrutiny for laws that “prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities” and planting the seed of what would later become the
familiar tiers of scrutiny).
209. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 190.
210. Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL. L. REV. 933,
965 (1989).
211. Id. See also James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements:
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 856–57 (2002) (finding that Jacobson
imposed limits on the state’s police powers).
212. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 188.
213. Id. at 189.
214. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992); Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).
215. Hill, supra note 180, at 108 (“In the context of a pandemic, the Whole Woman’s Health
standard for deciding whether a burden is ‘undue’ already allows courts to take into account the
urgency and time-sensitivity of the state’s interests in preserving hospital capacity, maintaining the
supply of PPE, and limiting contact. The court must then balance those benefits against the burden
on the individual’s right to access abortion . . . .”); Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 189
(“[W]hat the coronavirus pandemic helps to make clear is that even widespread, mass incursions
into civil liberties, such as statewide shelter-in-place orders, can generally survive modern
constitutional scrutiny under most circumstances.”).
216. Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 927 (6th Cir. 2020).
217. See United States ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (involving
smallpox); Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016) (involving Ebola); Reynolds v.
McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973) (involving venereal disease).
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a 1963 case about the mandatory quarantine of a woman returning from
Sweden who was suspected of having contracted smallpox, the district court
did not articulate which level of scrutiny it applied in upholding the federal
quarantine order.218 The court did, however, inquire into the reasonableness
of the health officials’ medical and scientific justifications for the woman’s
quarantine.219 In Hickox v. Christie, the district court noted that “[a]
restriction can be so arbitrary or overbroad as to be impermissible,” but it
ultimately found no constitutional violation in the mandatory quarantine of a
nurse returning to the United States from Ebola-stricken Sierra Leone.220 In
Reynolds v. Nichols, the district court upheld the mandatory detention
without bond of a sex worker suspected of having a venereal disease.221
In all of these cases, the imposed quarantines were upheld by the
courts.222 None of the courts, however, interpreted the state’s police powers
as imposing such a deferential standard, effectively a suspension of judicial
review, as the Abbott VI and In re Rutledge courts did.223 The Abbott II
approach, endorsed by the Eighth Circuit in Rutledge, contended that:
Jacobson instructs that all constitutional rights may be reasonably
restricted to combat a public health emergency. We could avoid
applying Jacobson here only if the Supreme Court had specifically
exempted abortion rights from its general rule. It has never done
so. To the contrary, the Court has repeatedly cited Jacobson in
abortion cases without once suggesting that abortion is the only
right exempt from limitation during a public health emergency.224
This characterization of Jacobson assumes that a challenge to an
abortion restriction necessarily cannot stand under the Jacobson
framework.225 The deference afforded to the political branches under this
framework negates the inquiry into the rationale for the policy that Whole
218. Siegel, 219 F. Supp. at 791.
219. Id. (“The words cautioning against light use of isolation are indeed strong but the three
medical men who testified manifestly shared a concern that was evident and real and reasoned.
Their differentiation of the case of [the woman’s husband] was forthright, reasoned and
circumstantially reassuring.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
220. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 592–93.
221. Reynolds, 488 F.2d at 1383.
222. Siegel, 219 F. Supp. at 791; Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 592–94; id. at 603 (dismissing all
federal causes of action for damages); Reynolds, 488 F.2d at 1383.
223. See Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696, 723 (5th Cir. 2020) (concluding that an exceptional exercise
of mandamus relief was warranted because the district court “usurp[ed] . . . the state’s power by
second-guessing ‘the wisdom and efficacy of [its] emergency measures’”) (quoting Abbott II, 954
F.3d 772, 795 (5th Cir. 2020)); In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (8th Cir. 2020) (following
the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and concluding that state emergency public health measures may only
be struck down in rare instances where the measures are pretextual) (citing Abbott II, 954 F.3d at
784–85 and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)).
224. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 786.
225. Id.
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Woman’s Health not only permits, but requires.226 The Jacobson Court itself,
however, referred extensively to the thorough medical justifications for
mandatory vaccines as a legitimate exercise of the police powers.227
Professor Burris, over thirty years before the COVID-19 pandemic began,
assumed that for cases in which heightened scrutiny normally applied—like
cases implicating the abortion right228—heightened scrutiny would also apply
in regards to state health actions.229
As discussed in Section II.A.1, the Fifth Circuit cited Kansas v.
Hendricks230 in its decision to uphold Texas’s temporary ban on abortion for
the proposition that Jacobson relaxes ordinary constitutional scrutiny.231
However, the Hendricks Court only held that constitutional rights of
individuals may be restricted in civil contexts. 232 It is also true, as the Fifth
Circuit noted, that the Supreme Court has cited Jacobson in its abortion
jurisprudence, but only for the proposition that constitutional rights are not
absolute.233 Plaintiff abortion providers in Abbott II and Rutledge did not
contend that the abortion right is absolute, only that, under the proportional
standard of constitutional scrutiny articulated in Casey and Whole Woman’s
Health, the state orders unconstitutionally restrict previability abortions. 234
In addition to misinterpreting what Jacobson required, the Fifth Circuit
tipped the scale of the Jacobson test by directing the district court to evaluate
whether the executive order had a “real or substantial relation” to the public
health emergency as a whole, despite the fact that the challenge was an as226. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).
227. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 23–24.
228. Although the undue burden test is not the most traditional articulation of heightened
scrutiny, Justice Breyer made clear in Whole Woman’s Health that the undue burden test is a higher
form of scrutiny than rational basis review. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 at 2309 (“[The Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation of the second part of the undue burden test] is wrong to equate the judicial
review applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with the less strict
review applicable [in other contexts].”).
229. Burris, supra note 210, at 935.
230. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
231. Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772, 785 (5th Cir. 2020).
232. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356–57.
233. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905)).
234. See Second Am. Compl. 4, Abbott III, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 WL 1815587 (W.D.
Tex. Apr. 9, 2020) (demonstrating the proportional nature of abortion constitutional analysis by
noting that “[t]he Texas Attorney General’s enforcement threats are a blatant effort to exploit a
public health crisis to advance an extreme, anti-abortion agenda, without any benefit to the state in
terms of preventing or resolving shortages of PPE or hospital capacity”) (emphasis added);
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction 26, Little Rock Fam. Plan. Servs. v. Rutledge, No. 4:19-cv-00449-KGB,
2020 WL 2777815 (E.D. Ark. June 26, 2019) (acknowledging that the undue burden test is
proportional in nature, but even so, “[p]laintiffs are likely to succeed [on the merits] because the
burdens of the COVID-19 Abortion Ban far outweigh its purported benefits.”).
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applied one.235 The district court never enjoined enforcement of the
executive order in its entirety.236 Thus, in addition to using an improper
mechanism for relief, the Fifth Circuit imposed the incorrect test on the
district court.237 Of course the district court failed to abide by the “spirit of
[the Abbott II] mandate,”238 because the spirit of the mandate demanded that
the challenge could not stand under the articulated framework.239 For the
reasons outlined above, this articulated framework was incorrect.240
B. Orders restricting access to abortion during the COVID-19
pandemic mirror past efforts to restrict the abortion right.
After the Supreme Court decided Casey in 1992, anti-abortion
advocates designed their strategy to restrict abortion as much as possible
within the confines of Casey.241 These strategies reflect a “death by a
thousand cuts” approach to curtailing the abortion right, making access to
abortion so restricted as to effectively ban it.242 Anti-abortion legislation
generally fall into one of three categories: (1) laws that impose delays on
individuals seeking abortions;243 (2) laws that ban intact D&E abortions;244
and (3) laws that impose “commonsense” health and safety measures that are
actually unnecessary.245 Laws in this third category, often referred to as
TRAP laws, make accessing abortion more difficult in the name of promoting

235. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 787.
236. See Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *6 (“[B]ased on the court’s findings of fact, it is
beyond question that the Executive Order’s burdens outweigh the order’s benefits as applied to
Plaintiffs’ provision of (1) medication abortion; and (2) procedural abortions where, in the treating
physician’s medical judgment, the patient would otherwise be denied access to abortion . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
237. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696, 729 n.8 (5th Cir. 2020) (Dennis, J., dissenting in part).
238. Id. at 711 (majority opinion).
239. See Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 786 (suggesting that the only way this challenge could succeed
is if Jacobson did not apply at all); Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 724 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
majority simply disagrees with the district court’s decisions on matters that are squarely within its
discretion.”).
240. See supra Sections II.A.1–2.
241. John A. Robertson, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and the Future of Abortion
Regulation, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 623, 626 (2017).
242. Serena Mayeri, How Abortion Rights Will Die a Death by 1,000 Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/opinion/brett-kavanaugh-abortion-rights-roecasey.html.
243. Robertson, supra note 241, at 626. These laws include informed consent requirements that
play out as waiting periods and/or mandatory ultrasound laws. Id.
244. Id. at 627. This is the type of law that was at issue in Stenberg v. Carhart and Gonzales v.
Carhart. Id.
245. Id. at 627–28. These laws impose restrictions on abortion clinics that are already subjected
to ordinary medical clinic health and safety regulations. Id. The heightened requirements often
lead to the closure of many abortion facilities. Id.
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health and safety, but have few actual medical benefits.246 These laws often
lead to the closure of abortion facilities.247 Because the majority of women
seeking abortions have low incomes, the barriers imposed by these laws also
reduce the frequency of abortions by inflating the financial and emotional
stress of obtaining one.248 State emergency orders responding to the COVID19 pandemic, and the judicial decisions upholding enforcement of the orders
as applied to abortions, exemplify other TRAP laws imposed since the Casey
decision.249 The temporary abortion bans resulting from the orders use delay
tactics to essentially eliminate abortions altogether.250 The orders also
impose restrictions on abortion facilities that appear neutral, but actually aim
to restrict abortion as much as possible without sufficient medical benefits to
warrant such restrictions.251
1. State emergency orders diminish the abortion right through
delay, possibly to the point of obsolescence.
Using the pandemic as a pretext to cut off abortion access is a political
strategy often wielded by anti-abortion advocates.252 The goal of many
TRAP laws is to regulate abortion facilities to the point of obsolescence.253
Likewise, temporary state abortion bans render performance of abortions an
impossibility without severe consequences for abortion providers.254
Because of the exceptionally time-sensitive nature of pregnancy, temporary
bans on abortion can serve as an outright ban.255 Although state emergency
246. Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Feb. 1, 2021),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers.
247. Robertson, supra note 241, at 627–28.
248. Jenna Jerman, Lori F. Frohwirth, Megan L. Kavanaugh, & Nakeisha Blades, Barriers to
Abortion Care and Their Consequences for Patients Traveling for Services: Qualitative Findings
from Two States, 49 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 95, 95 (2017),
https://www.guttmacher.org/journals/psrh/2017/04/barriers-abortion-care-and-their-consequencespatients-traveling-services.
249. See infra Sections II.B.1–2.
250. See infra Section II.B.1.
251. See infra Section II.B.2.
252. Hill, supra note 180, at 100.
253. Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 246. These laws include regulations
applying to doctors’ offices including the width of hallways, the size of procedure rooms, and the
distance of the office from a hospital. Id. It also includes licensing requirements like hospital
admitting privileges requirements. Id. The Supreme Court ruled some of these requirements
unconstitutional for posing an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion in Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt. 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
254. Abbott III, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 WL 1815587, at *2, *5 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020).
255. Id. at *7; Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696, 727 (5th Cir. 2020) (Dennis, J., dissenting in part);
Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1180 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Jackson, supra note 158, at
54 (highlighting the unique nature of abortion and the constitutional right to obtain one). But see
Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 707 (concluding that the executive order did not operate as a categorical ban
on abortion).
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orders postponing elective surgeries and procedures appear to neutrally target
other types of medical procedures as well,256 the requirement that an abortion
occur within a limited period of time, often by twenty to twenty-two weeks
makes abortion unique.257
Relying on the purported temporary nature of the state orders allows
anti-abortion advocates to feign compliance with the Casey and Whole
Woman’s Health undue burden test while impinging on a woman’s right to a
previability abortion.258 The Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that the Texas
executive order, as applied to abortions, was a categorical ban on abortion for
the women who would reach twenty-two weeks LMP—the legal cutoff for
obtaining an abortion in Texas—before the expiration of the executive
order.259 To uphold the ban, the court had to find that it was not a categorical
ban on abortion, as that would be a clear violation of Roe260 and Casey,261 and
that abortions are “elective” or “non-essential” so as to fall within the
purview of the state orders.262 The states defending their orders, therefore,
characterized the bans as only temporary delays in abortion access.263 But
this “temporary delay” characterization also fails the undue burden test of
Casey and Whole Woman’s Health because the delay is significant enough to
impose a substantial obstacle on a woman seeking an abortion.264 In some
cases, the so-called “temporary” order pushed some pregnant patients past
the twenty-two weeks LMP cutoff, making it illegal for them to obtain an
abortion at all in Texas.265 Even if the bans are only temporary, the surge of
people seeking abortions after the expiration of the temporary ban would lead

256. Some abortion providers in these cases concede that those imposing the orders do not have
the express purpose of targeting abortions. Pre-Term Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 20-3365, 2020
WL 1673310, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2020).
257. See id. (noting that Ohio’s cutoff for obtaining an abortion is twenty-two weeks); Robinson,
957 F. 3d at 1180 (noting that Alabama’s cutoff for obtaining an abortion is twenty weeks).
258. See Hill, supra note 180, at 112 (“[By using the words ‘elective’ or ‘non-essential’ in most
state orders], anti-abortion officials were able to exploit a particular popular understanding of
electiveness in the abortion context that would not apply to other medical procedures.”).
259. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 707. The Eighth Circuit also rejected this framing. In re Rutledge,
956 F.3d 1018, 1030 (8th Cir. 2020).
260. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
261. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
262. S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, 808 F. App’x 677, 679 (10th Cir. 2020); Pre-Term
Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 20-3365, 2020 WL 1673310, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2020); Adams &
Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 918 (6th Cir. 2020); Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171,
1174 (11th Cir. 2020); Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 2020); In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018,
1023 (8th Cir. 2020).
263. See, e.g., Slatery, 956 F.3d at 922; Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 717 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting the
temporary nature of the order).
264. Hill, supra note 180, at 109.
265. Abbott III, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 WL 1815587, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020)
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to even more delays.266 The fact of the matter is: mandating the delay of all
abortions “completely removes the ability of the person affected to exercise
her constitutional right to an abortion for as long as the order remains in
place.”267
2. State emergency orders restricting abortion during the pandemic
mirror TRAP laws because the emergency orders as applied to
abortions have few, if any, medical benefits.
State orders restricting abortions during an emergency health crisis are
further similar to TRAP laws in that they provide few medical benefits yet
purport to promote health and safety.268 In the cases of state emergency bans
on non-essential medical procedures, including abortion, the health and
safety benefits purportedly come in the form of fighting the spread of the
pandemic.269 The orders, however, do not promote the health of either the
individual pregnant patients or the general public at risk of contracting
COVID-19.270
The temporary bans on abortion do not promote the health of pregnant
people.271 In Abbott II, the majority acknowledged the possibility of
exploitation of the order to advance political anti-abortion goals,272 and the
district court concluded accordingly that the order’s burdens beyond question
outweighed its benefits as applied to both medication abortions and
procedural abortions where delaying the procedure would push the patient
past the state cutoff for obtaining an abortion.273 Health risks for both
abortion and pregnancy increase as the pregnancy progresses.274 As noted by
Professor B. Jessie Hill, “[p]regnancy progresses inevitably and relatively
quickly . . . .”275
The longer a pregnancy progresses, the risk of
266. Id.
267. Jackson, supra note 158, at 54.
268. See infra Section II.B.2.
269. Hill, supra note 180, at 100–01.
270. See Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *3–6 (detailing findings that the Texas executive order
did not further its stated goals and, in fact, imposed an increased health risk on women who would
be delayed in obtaining an abortion).
271. Id. See also Hill, supra note 180, at 112–16 (discussing how the word “elective” is
misinterpreted in the context of abortions and how the same misinterpretation is not present in
discussions of other types of medical procedures).
272. Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772, 792 (5th Cir. 2020).
273. Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *6 (noting that a woman in Texas might be denied access
to abortion entirely because either “the patient’s pregnancy would reach [twenty-two] weeks LMP
by April 21, 2020; or the patient’s pregnancy would reach [eighteen] weeks LMP by April 21, 2020,
thus requiring abortion care at an ASC and, in the judgment of the treating physician, the patient is
unlikely to be able to obtain an abortion at an ASC before the patient’s pregnancy reaches the
[twenty-two]-week cutoff”).
274. Id. at *5.
275. Hill, supra note 180, at 109.
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complications increases—as much as thirty-eight percent per week.276
Women who passed the gestational age cutoff for either medication
abortions, or D&E abortions during the ban would then have to obtain a
riskier abortion at a later gestational stage once the order expired, subjecting
themselves to higher risk of complications.277
Abortion patients rarely need to be hospitalized,278 and women
continuing their pregnancies are actually more likely to need and seek out
care in a hospital.279 Pregnant women who could not obtain an abortion
would also still need medical care during this period.280 The Texas order
even permitted ordinary in-office visits to continue during the period the
executive order was in effect.281 Additionally, the cost of an abortion
increases with gestational age, putting more financial and emotional stress on
patients prevented from obtaining an abortion for even a short period of
time.282 This is an especially important factor considering that most women
who seek abortions have low incomes.283 Some women unable to get an
abortion in Texas were instead travelling out of state by car and airplane for
both medication and procedure abortions.284 Travelling out of state during a
pandemic is a health risk that public officials in every state have
acknowledged,285 but it is not even an option for most women seeking
abortions, most of whom are low-income and do not have the expendable
funds to travel or potentially miss work, especially when some states have
required out-of-state travelers to quarantine for two weeks.286
Applying state orders temporarily banning elective procedures to
abortion likewise does not promote the health justifications relating to the

276. Id. (citing Linda A. Bartlett et al, Risk Factors for Legal Induced Abortion-Related
Mortality in the United States, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 729, 731 (2004)).
277. Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *5.
278. Id. at *3; Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1181 (11th Cir. 2020).
279. Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *4.
280. Id. at *3.
281. Texas Medical Board (TMB) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Regarding Non-Urgent
Elective Surgeries and Procedures During Texas Disaster Declaration for COVID-19 Pandemic,
TEX. MED. BD. (Mar. 29, 2020), https://med.uth.edu/ortho/wp-content/uploads/sites/60/2020/03/
TMB-COVID-19-Elective-Surgery-FAQs-Updated-20200329.pdf (clarifying that “the prohibition
does not apply to office-based visits without surgeries or procedures”).
282. Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *6.
283. Jerman, supra note 248, at 95.
284. Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *5.
285. See Sarah Mervosh, Denise Lu, & Vanessa Swales, See Which States and Cities Have Told
Residents to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html (documenting which states had some
form of a shelter-in-place order by April 20, 2020).
286. Jerman, supra note 248, at 95.
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COVID-19 pandemic.287 The Abbott III district court found that application
of the executive order to abortions would not even help the state achieve its
stated goal of preserving PPE or increasing hospital capacity.288 Abortions
generally are performed in outpatient settings that use few resources;
medication abortions are even self-administered at the patient’s home.289 As
such, medication abortions do not require any PPE and, on the rare occasion
that follow-ups are needed, they occur in outpatient settings, not hospitals.290
Pre-procedure ultrasounds, required twenty-four hours before an abortion in
Texas, use only minimal PPE and were exempt from the order as “officebased visits without surgery or procedures” where “non-invasive diagnostic
tests” would be performed.291 Women continuing their pregnancies are
actually more likely to use more hospital resources than women who sought
abortions.292 Women continuing their pregnancies would also need more inperson care—and thus use more PPE—than women who received
abortions.293 Women who would be unable to have an abortion due to the
executive orders would require both PPE and hospital space when giving
birth.294
Abortion-related caselaw requires that the veracity of the purported
medical benefits be sufficient to justify an imposition on a woman’s right to
terminate her pregnancy.295 Emergency public health jurisprudence also
takes the relevance of health benefits into account.296 As Professor Burris
observed, “Jacobson was not based on the irrelevance of medical facts but
on the overwhelming medical support for smallpox vaccination.”297 The
medical justifications for applying state temporary bans on medical
procedures to abortion clearly do not have the purported health benefits that
anti-abortion advocates claim and must thus be struck down as

287. Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *3–6; Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696, 730–31 (5th Cir. 2020)
(Dennis, J., dissenting in part).
288. Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *4.
289. Jackson, supra note 158, at 54.
290. Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *3.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at *5.
295. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016).
296. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 35 (“Since then, vaccination, as a means of
protecting a community against smallpox, finds strong support in the experience of this and other
countries, no court, much less a jury, is justified in disregarding the action of the legislature simply
because in its or their opinion that particular method was—perhaps, or possibly—not the best either
for children or adults.”).
297. Burris, supra note 210, at 962.
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unconstitutional TRAP laws that infringe upon the right to terminate a
pregnancy, even (and especially) during a pandemic.298
C. Looking Ahead: Abortion Regulation Further Into and After the
Pandemic
Courts abdicating their role as a check on the political branches is
incredibly dangerous during a pandemic.299 Not only could a lack of judicial
review passively condone infringement of civil rights in the present, but it
could also affirmatively provide a blueprint for limiting civil rights in the
future.300 Though, nearly a full year later, the Supreme Court vacated both
the Sixth and the Fifth Circuits’ long-expired orders,301 the effects of the
orders have already been felt. In addition, vacating the orders as moot leaves
open the possibility for future orders whose merits are substantively
similar.302
Some critics have argued that the COVID-19 pandemic may lead to
strengthening of the abortion right.303 This view presumes that issues of
gender and racial inequality that the pandemic has exacerbated will lead to a
jurisprudential shift in defining the abortion right from one of substantive due
process to equal protection.304 Presumably, this new framework would better
allow the abortion right to stand undisturbed where states impose temporary
abortion bans in the name of public safety.305 A classification based on
pregnancy, though, is not the same as one based on sex or gender.306 Thus,
under an equal protection analysis, the state orders would only need to
survive rational basis review as applied to abortion restrictions.307 The undue
burden test, born from substantive due process, on the other hand, is a form

298. See supra Section II.B.2.
299. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 183.
300. Id.
301. Slatery v. Adams & Boyle, P.C., 141 S. Ct. 1262, 1263 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2021), vacating as
moot 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020).
302. Adam Lidgett, High Court Axes COVID-19 Texas, Tenn. Abortion Decisions, LAW360 (Jan
25, 2021, 6:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1348088/high-court-axes-covid-19-texastenn-abortion-decisions-?_ga=2.170492640.1323691957.1613013748-183638477.1560918015.
The Sixth Circuit’s order prevented Tennessee officials from imposing a temporary abortion ban,
and the Fifth’s required enforcement of Texas’s temporary ban. Id.
303. See generally Ariane Frosh, Reproducing Equality: How COVID-19 Can Strengthen
Abortion Rights, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 80 (2020) (arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic
may lead to a shift in the abortion jurisprudence where the right to terminate a pregnancy would be
protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, rather than the Due Process
Clause).
304. Id. at 83.
305. Id. at 84–85.
306. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974).
307. Id. at 495.
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of heightened scrutiny that provides a higher level of protection for the right
to have an abortion.308
Though such a drastic shift in the Supreme Court’s abortion
jurisprudence is unlikely,309 there is historical evidence that a public health
crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic may lead to a liberalization of abortion
rights.310 After public health crises like rubella and the scare surrounding the
Thalidomide drug, reproductive rights expanded.311 The COVID-19
pandemic may spark the public’s desire to more voraciously protect abortion
rights and other civil liberties.312 One area where this liberalization is likely
to take place in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic—and, indeed,
already has—is in the in-person requirement for obtaining abortion-inducing
medication.313 Abortion providers in Maryland were initially successful in
obtaining an injunction regarding the in-person visits required to receive a
medication abortion.314 Even after the Supreme Court subsequently stayed
the injunction, the FDA decided not to enforce the in-person requirements of
its own volition.315 That is not the end of the story, however, as the attorneys
general for Indiana, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma have asked the Fourth
Circuit to let them intervene in the litigation to defend the in-person
requirements.316 In any event, if in-person requirements prove unnecessary
and unduly burdensome during a pandemic, perhaps support for eliminating

308. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016) (clarifying that
the undue burden test is a form of heightened scrutiny).
309. This is especially true considering the recent change in the makeup of the Supreme Court,
the now six-justice conservative bloc is unlikely to strengthen the abortion right. Ariane de Vogue,
Amy Coney Barrett’s Record of Advocating for Limits to Abortion Rights, CNN (Oct. 6, 2020, 9:00
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/06/politics/amy-coney-barrett-abortion-record/index.html.
310. See Leah Moczulski, Public Health Crises and Abortion: The Need for a Reinterpretation
of the Helms Amendment’s “Family Planning” Provision in Light of the Zika Epidemic, 32 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 289, 292 (2018) (arguing that liberalization of abortion rights have coincided with
public health outbreaks across the globe).
311. Id. (citing Donald J. Kenney, Thalidomide-Catalyst to Abortion Reform, 5 ARIZ. L. REV.
105, 110 (1964)).
312. Id. (noting the historical correlation between the liberalization of abortion rights and public
health emergencies).
313. Joint Mot. to Hold Appeals in Abeyance 1, 7, ECF No. 103, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists v. FDA, No. 20-1824 (4th Cir. Apr. 13, 2021).
314. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183, 232 (D. Md.
2020).
315. Joint Motion to Hold Appeals in Abeyance 7, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
No. 20-1824.
316. Response/Reply Brief of Intervenors-Appellants 15, ECF No. 91, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, No. 20-1824 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 2021).
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the requirements will gain traction as telemedicine expands beyond the
pandemic.317
More likely, however, is the probability that the understanding of the
abortion right during the COVID-19 pandemic could provide a blueprint for
using state emergency police powers to curtail the right in the future. 318
Though the litigation surrounding state emergency orders delaying some
medical procedures has seemingly died down, new surges of coronavirus
infections may stir up additional litigation. 319 If anti-choice advocates
succeed, the suspension of judicial review model, adopted by some courts as
a result their interpretation of Jacobson, might allow the expansion of the
states’ police powers to operate as a mechanism to curtail access to abortion
(and other civil liberties) for indefinite periods of time.320 The suspension of
judicial review model also prevents the development of strong caselaw
around constitutional issues during a public health emergency.321
III. CONCLUSION
States are perfectly within their rights to exercise their police powers to
protect the health and safety of the public during the COVID-19 pandemic.322
Some emergency measures chosen by the states may infringe on citizens’
constitutional rights—like the right to terminate a pregnancy—but such
measures must be reasonable.323
In analyzing whether a state
unconstitutionally banned access to abortion procedures through state orders
postponing all elective or non-essential procedures, courts misapplied
Jacobson v. Massachusetts normatively and descriptively.324 The functional
bans on abortion—even if only temporary—are merely the latest attempt by
anti-abortion advocates to restrict abortion to the point of obsolescence.325
As the pandemic continues ravaging the country, we will likely continue to
317. See Jessica Valenti, Opinion, The Anti-Abortion Movement Can’t Use This Myth Anymore,
N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/opinion/abortion-pill-fdacovid.html; see also Using Telehealth Services, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(Updated June 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/telehealth.html
(outlining the benefits of telemedicine).
318. See Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 183 (arguing that without ordinary judicial review,
we run the risk of allowing the government to use emergency measures as a pretext for violating
civil rights and citing Korematsu v. United States as an example of this problem); see also Hill,
supra note 180, at 119–22 (arguing that a rhetorical reframing of abortions as normal healthcare is
necessary to protect the abortion right from unnecessary targeted restrictions).
319. Hill, supra note 180, at 110–11.
320. See supra Section II.A.1.
321. See Cole, supra note 170, at 2566.
322. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
323. Id. at 26; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
324. See supra Section II.A.
325. See supra Section II.B.
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see similar attacks on abortion.326 Without a restructuring of public
emergency jurisprudence and a reframing of the abortion right, the right to
an abortion remains extremely vulnerable during the COVID-19 pandemic—
and, perhaps, beyond it.327

326. See supra Section II.C.
327. See supra Section II.C.

